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COMMENT
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN VIRGINIA:
PERSPECTIVES AND DIRECTION
Collective bargaining for public employees can cause a number of problems,
but the failure to examine seriously this possibility is an invitation to even
greater problems. Conditions have changed and continue to change in the
field of public employment. It is unwise to fail to recognize these changes and
even more unwise to fail to respond to them.'
In order to appreciate the problems and challenges presented by public
employee collective bargaining, one should first consider the tremendous
growth of the public sector in recent decades. In 1946, there were approxi-
mately six million persons employed at all levels of government.2 By 1974,
the total stood at nearly fifteen million. The number of state and local
government employees rose from about three and one-half million in 1946,
to over eleven and one-half million in 1974.1
With this increase in the number of public employees, union member-
ship has become an important issue in public sector labor relations. As of
1972, about fifty-two percent of all federal employees were covered by
union agreements and about one million were union members. 5 In state
and local governments in 1972, about twenty-eight percent of all employees
were covered by union agreements and over two and one-half million be-
longed to unions.' The reasons given for public employee unionism range
from the usual practical and economic considerations, to a desire to con-
tribute to the decision-making process.7
Public employee unionism and collective bargaining are thus realities of
modern government administration. The situation has triggered considera-
1. COMMISSION TO STUDY THE RIGHTS OF PuBLc EMPLOYEES, INTERIM REPORT TO THE GoVER-
NOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, H. Doc. No. 28, at 21 (1975) (statement of J.
Samuel Glasscock) [hereinafter cited as STUDY COMMISSION].
2. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsTIcS, DEP' OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS BULL.
No. 1865 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. The numbers of public employees in 1946
were 2.434 million federal and 3.567 million state and local (0.804 million state and 2.762
million local).
3. Id. The numbers of public employees in 1974 were 2.874 million federal and 11.794
million state and local (3.155 million state and 8.639 million local).
4. Id.
5. Hearings on H.R. 12532, H.R. 7684 and H.R. 9324 Before a Special Subcomm. on Labor
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1972).
6. Id.
7. See Brown, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Perspectives and Legislative
Opportunities, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Public Sector].
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ble response at both the state and national levels.' The purpose of this
comment is to analyze how other jurisdictions have dealt with collective
bargaining in the public sector and compare this to the existing judicial
and legislative posture on the issue in Virginia.
NATIONAL RESPONSE
In 1959, Wisconsin became the first state to pass legislation authorizing
public employee collective bargaining.9 Federal action followed in 1962
when President Kennedy extended organizational and collective bargain-
ing rights to federal employees. 10 Executive Order No. 11,491, issued in
1969, added further provisions and created a Federal Labor Relations
Council to administer the procedures already established."
On the state level, legislative action has developed rapidly in the past
decade. There are now thirty-six states with some form, of legislation ex-
pressly authorizing collective bargaining in the public sector.2 Statutes
authorizing mutual collective bargaining for all state and local employees
are in force in twenty-three states. 3 Another thirteen states have separate
laws covering one or a number of specific groups of employees. 4
There are thirteen states which have no bargaining legislation.' 5 The
case law in four of these states prohibits public employees from bargaining
8. For an overview of the area, a list of cases and a bibliography, see H.D. JASCOURT, PUBLIC
SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS: RECENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS (Council of State Governments
pub. 1975) [hereinafter cited as TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS].
9. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (1974) (authorizing municipalities to collectively bargain with
their employees).
10. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-63 Compilation), revoked, Exec. Order No.
11,491, 3 C.F.R. 254 (1974), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970). This was a comprehensive order which
guaranteed the right to negotiate a written contract, established election procedures and
unfair labor practices, contained a strong management rights clause, placed wages and hours
outside the scope of collective bargaining and established advisory arbitration for grievances.
11. 3 C.F.R. 254 (1974), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
12. LABOR-MANAGEMENT SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABOR
RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SUMMARY OF STATE POLICY REGULATIONS FOR PUBLIC SECTOR
LABOR RELATIONS (1975) [hereinafter cited as STATE SUMMARY]. State statutes vary widely
in the manner in which they deal with basic provisions and procedures associated with
collective bargaining. For a discussion of the ways these statutes differ on issues of coverage,
administrative machinery, representation questions, bargaining obligations, impasse proce-
dures, strike resolution and union security arrangements, see Public Sector, supra note 7, at
63-78.
13. STATE SUMMARY, supra note 12.
14. Id. The most common groups singled out for separate legislation are teachers, police
officers and fire fighters.
15. Id.
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collectively absent express statutory authority. 6 In the rest of the states
lacking legislative guidelines, courts have upheld the validity of voluntary
collective bargaining.'" One state has a statute which expressly prohibits
public sector collective bargaining.'"
Most of the statutes authorizing public employees to bargain collectively
include provisions which expressly prohibit strikes.'9 A limited right to
strike is recognized, however, in seven states.N Where this right exists, only
non-essential employees are allowed to strike; even then, the activity may
be enjoined if it poses a threat to the public health or safety.2 '
Public employee labor relations affect government at all levels through-
out the country. Problems in this area may be of national as well as local
consequence. If state action is sluggish or inadequate to handle the situa-
tion, Congress may step in to preempt state authority. Indeed, proposals
for federal legislation covering both state and federal employees regularly
appear in Congress.2 2 The bills introduced suggest action ranging from the
creation of a federal public sector labor relations board,2 to extending the
National Labor Relations Act to cover all state and local employees.24
PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA
Like most other states, Virginia law expressly prohibits public employee
strikes.2 The Code is silent, however, on the general question of collective
bargaining in the public sector.2 This silence has raised several questions
as to: (1) whether public employees in Virginia have a constitutional right
to organize and join unions; (2) whether public employees have a constitu-
tional right to bargain, or public employers a duty to bargain and (3)
whether agreements reached through voluntary bargaining are legally en-
forceable."
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. "Non-essential" employees are those whose presence is not required to maintain the
health and safety of the community.
22. TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 8, at 10.
23. H.R. 1488, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
24. H.R. 77, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). For a discussion of such legislation and
considerations of federalism, see Petro, Sovereignty and Compulsory Public-Sector
Bargaining, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 25, 40, 160 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Sovereignty].
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-55 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
26. The one exception is that public transit employees have been granted statutory bar-
gaining rights. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1357.2 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
27. See Brown, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: An Emerging Reality, 2 VA. B.J. 7
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The Right to Organize
The right of public employees to join unions was first confronted by the
Supreme Court of Virginia in 1935.1 In that case, the court denied fire
fighters in the City of Norfolk the right to join unions. The issue came up
again in 1955 before the Law and Chancery Court of the City of Norfolk, 9
and the trial court followed the earlier court decision that local govern-
ments could bar fire fighters from unionizing, adding that Virginia's right-
to-work law did not apply to public employees. 31
In 1946, the General Assembly adopted Senate Joint Resolution 12 3
which stated that it was against the public policy of Virginia for any public
employer to recognize or negotiate with a labor union acting as a represent-
ative of any public employees." The Resolution did allow public employees
to form organizations not affiliated with any labor union to discuss
conditions of employment. While Senate Joint Resolution 12 has some-
times been treated by public employers as a definitive statement of the law
in Virginia," the courts have held that it is merely a statement of public
policy and does not carry the force of law.3 1
The viability of these early Virginia decisions and Senate Joint
Resolution 12 was seriously undermined by federal court decisions recog-
nizing the constitutional right of public employees to organize. 36 In several
1970 opinions, the Attorney General of Virginia acknowledged that public
employees do have the right to unionize,37 and, in 1971, a federal district
(1976). This article also suggests the role an attorney might play in public sector bargaining
relationships in Virginia.
28. Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180 S.E. 410 (1935).
29. Verhaagen v. Reeder, Law No. C.447 (Ct. of L. and Ch. of the City of Norfolk, 1955),
appeal denied, 198 Va. lxxix (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 974 (1957).
30. Id.
31. S.J. Res. 12, 1946 Va. Acts 1006.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Address by Attorney General of Virginia Andrew P. Miller, Conference on Labor-
Management Relations in the Public Sector, Oct. 16, 1975, at 3-4 [hereinafter cited as
Address].
35. Fire Fighters Local 794 v. City of Newport News, 307 F. Supp. 1113, 1115 (E.D. Va.
1969). See also H.J. Res. 108, Va. Gen. Assembly (1976), which proposed that S.J. Res. 12
no longer reflected the public policy of Virginia. H.J. Res. 108 was referred to the Committee
on Labor and Commerce and was carried over to the 1977 session.
36. See generally American Fed'n of State Employees v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir.
1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296
F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (three-judge court); Comment, The Unclear Boundaries of the
Constitutional Rights, Public Employees, 44 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 389, 400 (1976).
37. 1969-70 VA. ATr'y GEN. Op. 158, 231.
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court in Virginia held a local ordinance forbidding fire fighters' organiza-
tions to affiliate with a labor union unconstitutional because it denied
employees the right to associate." Finally, the Virginia right-to-work law
was amended so that it now clearly provides that public employees have
the right to join unions. 9
The Right of Employees and the Duty of Employers to Bargain
Collectively
Granted the right to join unions, the question remains whether public
employees in Virginia may collectively bargain. Absent statutory lan-
guage, the primary source of guidance on the issue has been Attorney
General's Opinions."0 The Attorney General has summarized his position
as follows:
1. Absent express legislative authority to do so, public employers in Vir-
ginia cannot collectively bargain with their employees;
2. Public employers have the authority to meet with their employees to
discuss matters of mutual interest and adopt agreements embodying the
points agreed upon in the discussions;
3. The public employer must retain the right to make the final decision
in such matters;
4. If discussions are held with one group of employees, the right to be
heard cannot be denied to other groups of employees or individual employees;
and
5. If discussions are held with a governing body or a schoolboard, they
must be open to the public; if they are conducted by employees of such
governmental entities, they need not be open."
The right of public employees in Virginia to bargain collectively has been
considered in two federal court decisions.4 2 The Attorney General has
stated that these decisions are consistent with his position that public
employees do not have the right, and public employers do not have the
authority, to collectively bargain. 3 In one of these cases the court did state
that public employees do not have a constitutional right to bargain collec-
38. Carroll v. City of Norfolk, Civil No. 524-70-N (E.D. Va., April 20, 1971).
39. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-58 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1976).
40. See 1974-75, ATr'y GEN. Op. 78; id. at 22; id. at 76; 1969-70 VA. ATr'y GEN. OP. 158;
id. at 231.
41. Address, supra note 34, at 11.
42. Teamsters Local 822 v. City of Portsmouth, Civil No. 75-184-N (E.D. Va., Aug. 11,
1975); Fire Fighters Local 794 v. City of Newport News, 339 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Va. 1972).
43. Address, supra note 34, at 14.
44. Fire Fighters Local 794 v. City of Newport News, 339 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Va. 1972). The
constitutional right to organize and join unions has not been extended to include the right to
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tively.44 Both cases obscured, however, the issue of the employer's author-
ity to bargain by holding that absent any legislative mandate public em-
ployers in Virginia are under no duty to bargain." In concluding that a
public employer can refuse to bargain collectively, the courts raised, by
implication, the issue of whether a public employer may, if it chooses,
bargain collectively with its employees.46
The Legal Enforceability of Voluntary Collective Bargaining Agreements
in the Public Sector
For some time now, at least nineteen local governing bodies within Vir-
ginia have been operating under collective bargaining agreements with
some of their employees.47 The validity of such agreements was tested in a
recent Virginia case.4 8 The agreements involved in Commonwealth v.
Board of Supervisors of Arlington County 9 recognized the ultimate author-
ity of the county board and the school board to make all final decisions
preserved the right of individual employees to be heard, and specifically
collectively bargain. Indianapolis Educ. Ass'n v. Lewallen, 72 L.R.R.M. 2071 (7th Cir. 1969);
Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969)(three-judge court); Melton
v. City of Atlanta, 324 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (three-judge court).
45. Teamsters Local 822 v. City of Portsmouth, Civil No. 75-184-N (E.D. Va. Aug. 11,
1975); Fire Fighters Local 794 v. City of Newport News, 339 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Va. 1972).
46. Id.
47. STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 15.
48. Two cases were actually involved. Commonwealth v. Board of Supv'rs of Arlington Cty.
At Law No. 18747 (Arlington Co. Cir. Ct., Oct. 1, 1976); Commonwealth v. County School
Bd., At Law No. 18748 (Arlington Co. Cir. Ct., Oct. 1, 1976)[hereinafter both cases will be
referred to under the former style]. American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME) Local 2407 is a voluntary association of approximately 500 county
employees. The county has established a set of procedures whereby its non-managerial em-
ployees can, if they choose, form an employee organization for the purpose of meeting and
conferring with the county in a good faith endeavor to reach an agreement concerning hours,
wages and other terms of employment. In 1973, AFSCME Local 2407 negotiated a three-year
agreement with the county. The county board ratified the agreement on June 5, 1973. Since
the agreement expired on June 30, 1976, the parties negotiated a new two-year agreement.
Brief for Respondents at 2, 4, Commonwealth v. Board of Supervisors of Arlington Co., At
Law No. 18747 (Arlington Co. Cir. Ct., Oct. 1, 1976).
For approximately ten years, the Arlington School Board has been negotiating wages, hours
and working conditions for its teachers with its teachers' organization, the Arlington Educa-
tion Association. If and when such negotiations produce mutual agreement, a written contract
is prepared and executed by the school board and the employee representative. Brief for
Respondents at 3, Commonwealth v. County School Bd., At Law No. 18748 (Arlington Co.
Cir. Ct., Oct. 1, 1976).
The purpose of these and other such agreements is to promote the efficiency of public
services. See generally Teachers Local 858 v. School District, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo.
1970).
49. At Law No. 18747, 18748 (Arlington Co. Cir. Ct., Oct. 1, 1976).
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prohibited the employee organization from doing anything which would
directly or indirectly authorize, cause, encourage, engage in or condone any
strike. 0
The Commonwealth contended that the agreements were unlawful, void
and unenforceable. 5' The issue presented to the court was whether, absent
any express statutory authorization or prohibition, a county board or a
school board may adopt agreements" reached through voluntary meetings
with an employee organization. 53
Following a trend established in other jurisdictions,5 the Arlington court
ruled that the agreements were valid on the basis of implied authority 5
The court observed that express constitutional" and statutory57 provisions
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The court did not refer to the agreements as collective bargaining. Collective bargain-
ing is a phrase of art in the private sector, usually connoting the right to strike. The term
raises ambiguities when used in the context of public employee labor relations. The Arlington
court observed that there is no precise definition of collective bargaining, but if
collective bargaining merely connotes the process by which the principal respondents
confer with employee representatives in an effort to reach an accord regarding wages,
hours, and working conditions, then it is not inappropriate. However, if the term
contemplates or includes the right to strike upon inability to agree; procedures for
penalizing a party who refused to bargain in good faith or who engages in other unfair
labor practices; then it would be completely inapposite as applied to the agreements
in these cases.
Id. at 3.
53. Commonwealth v. Board of Supv'rs of Arlington Cty., At Law No. 18747, 18748 (Arling-
ton Co. Cir. Ct., Oct. 1, 1976).
54. In the absence of express statutory authority, several recent cases have upheld the
validity of agreements between school boards and employee organizations on the basis of
implied authority. See Dole, State and Local Public Employee Collective Bargaining in the
Absence of Explicit Legislative Authorization, 54 IowA L. Rav. 539 (1969). See also Chicago
Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966);
Louisiana Teachers Ass'n v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 303 So. 2d 564 (La. App. 1974), cert.
denied, 305 So. 2d 541 (La. 1975); Dayton Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Educ.,
41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E.2d 714 (1975). A number of courts has gone on to say that
although the public employer has no duty to bargain collectively, it may do so, if it chooses,
on the basis of implied authority. Cook County Police Ass'n v. City of Harvey, 8 Ill. App. 3d
147, 289 N.E.2d 226 (1972); State Bd. of Regents v. United Packing House Workers Local
1258, 175 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1970). But see Board of Educ. v. Scottsdale Educ. Ass'n, 17 Ariz.
App. 504, 498 P.2d 578 (1972).
55. Commonwealth v. Board of Supv'rs of Arlington Cty., At Law No. 18747, 18748 (Arling-
ton Co. Cir. Ct., Oct. 1, 1976).
56. VA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 7 provides that the supervision of schools in each school division
shall be vested in a school board.
57. General powers and responsibilities of local school boards are set out in VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 22-1 to -358 (Repl. Vol. 1973). The general power of county boards to manage their affairs
is contained in VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-689 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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make the school board an independent local agency empowered with a
general mandate to maintain and operate an efficient school system."
Specific grants of power authorize, 9 inter alia, the school board to employ
teachers and enter into written contracts." The court decided that the
power to enter into the challenged agreements was implied from the gen-
eral power to discharge statutory responsibilities and the specific power to
enter into employment contracts."
According to the Arlington County decision:
[T]he policy and agreements in each case, if not expressly authorized by the
statutory authority given are impliedly authorized and should be upheld
unless they are clearly contra to the public policy of this Commonwealth. 2
The public policy guidelines regarding collective bargaining agreements for
state employees consist of Senate Joint Resolution 12 and Virginia
Attorney General's Opinions. Considering Resolution 12 in the light of
subsequent court decisions and statutory enactments, 3 the circuit court
did not see it as a bar to the validity of the collective bargaining agree-
ments. 4
The Attorney General's position has not been entirely clear. In 1970, he
recognized that if a public employer negotiated, it would have to do so on
the basis of implied authority, but since this rationale had met with little
favor as a legal principle, he advised that the better practice would be to
enact enabling legislation if bargaining was desired. 5 In another opinion
he stated that although a school board could meet and discuss working
conditions with employee organizations, any agreements reached would be
of "doubtful enforceability." 8 In 1974, the Attorney General observed that
there is no law in Virginia which specifically prohibits or permits public
sector collective bargaining. 7 He advised, however, that the authority to
58. Commonwealth v. Board of Supv'rs of Arlington Cty., Law No. 18747, 18748 (Arlington
Co. Cir. Ct., Oct. 1, 1976).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-203 (Repl. Vol. 1973) states the power of school boards to employ
and dismiss teachers. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-217.2 (Repl. Vol. 1973) requires school boards to
make written contracts with teachers.
60. Commonwealth v. Board of Supv'rs of Arlington Cty., Law No. 18747, 18748 (Arlington
Co. Cir. Ct., Oct. 1, 1976).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 14.
63. See p. 434 supra.
64. Commonwealth v. Board of Supv'rs of Arlington Cty., Law No. 18747, 18748 (Arlington
Co. Cir. Ct., Oct. 1, 1976).
65. 1969-70 VA. Arr'y GEN. OP. 158.
66. Id. at 232.
67. 1974-75 VA. ATr'y GEN. OP. 77.
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bargain collectively cannot be implied from general powers granted locali-
ties." In a later opinion he again stated his position that a public employer
may not collectively bargain absent express statutory authorization, but
it may adopt agreements reached through discussions with employees pro-
vided it retained the right to make final decisions over such matters.69
The court decided that the Arlington County agreements substantially
conformed to the kind of agreements the Attorney General indicated pub-
lic employers could make with their employees. 0 The Arlington court
ruled, therefore, that upholding the legality of the agreements did not
violate the public policy of Virginia.7'
Another argument raised by the Commonwealth in Arlington County
was that the agreements represented an unlawful delegation of legislative
responsibility. The court rejected that argument in view of the fact that
the public employer retained the right of final decision on all agreements.
Furthermore, under the agreements, the public employer had the right to
decide not to agree at all. The agreements were voluntary and the employer
did not surrender any decision-making authority. Therefore, there was no
unlawful delegation of legislative prerogative.
71
In the absence of legislative guidelines, then, the Virginia courts have
fashioned a piecemeal collection of public employee rights. The courts
have recognized that "[t]he grant of approval to organize and associate
without the corresponding grant of recognition may well be an empty and
meaningless gesture. . .. ,,"3 In an attempt to deal with this situation, the
court in Arlington County took the first step toward establishing in Vir-
ginia the pubic employer's implied authority to bargain collectively with
its employees. Although the courts have been pressed into service in this
area, it has been strongly suggested that the "employer-employee relation-
ship in the government sector is a legislative matter." 4
68. Id.
69. Id. at 22.
70. Commonwealth v. Board of Supv'rs of Arlington Cty., Law No. 18747, 18748 (Arlington
Co. Cir. Ct., Oct. 1, 1976).
71. Id. The Arlington County decision will be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court. The
courts in nine of the thirteen states without enabling legislation have upheld the validity of
voluntary collective bargaining agreements. Despite the ruling in Arlington County that the
agreements do not violate public policy, however, the weight of the Attorney General's Opin-
ions indicate his belief that enabling legislation is a prerequisite to lawful collective bargain-
ing in the public sector. The Virginia Supreme Court may take this to be the prevailing state
of public policy and decline to enforce the agreements without legislative authority.
72. Id. at 18.
73. Richmond Educ. Ass'n v. Crockford, 55 F.R.D. 362, 364 (E.D. Va. 1972).
74. Fire Fighters Local 794 v. City of Newport News, 339 F. Supp. 13, 17 (E.D. Va. 1972).
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RECENT LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN VIRGINIA
In response to the increased activity in the field of public employee labor
relations, the General Assembly in 1972 created a commission to study the
rights of public employees. 75 Of the several recommendations offered by
the commission in its 1973 report, two were enacted into law. The first
placed public employees within the coverage of Virginia's right-to-work
law;7 the second created a grievance system for public employees.
77
Other legislative proposals seeking to establish a labor relations law were
defeated in 1973. The defeated proposals included three variations of a
meet and confer bill,78 and another bil7 which would have legalized collec-
tive bargaining contracts between public employers and public employees.
Similar enabling legislation has been proposed in 1974, 1975 and 1976;
none has made it out of committee.
75. H.J. Res. No. 122, 1972 Va. Acts 1645.
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-58 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1976).
77. Id. § 15.1-7.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
78. H.B. 1768, H.B. 1808, S.B. 906, Va. Gen. Assembly (1973).
79. H.B. 1891, Va. Gen. Assembly (1973).
80. The initial legislation has evolved and been refined into two proposals, the Public
Labor-Management Relations Act (meet and confer bill), and the Public Labor-Management
Contracts Act. In general, the legislation would accomplish the following:
(1) Provide for an omnibus definition of a public employee in order to give broad
effect to the recommended legislation; (2) prohibit strikes in the public sector; provide
for an omnibus and broad definition of a strike; create a broad presumption that
employees absent or abstaining from work during a strike are engaging in a strike and
further provide that the employees in violation of the strike prohibition be penalized
as provided under the public employer's personnel rules; (3) create a cause of action
in favor of a public employer which suffers damages caused by an employee organiza-
tion acting in violation of the strike prohibition; (4) provide for injunctive relief against
conduct violative of the strike prohibition and establish factors for a court to consider
when determining the contempt penalty for noncompliance with its orders; (5) permit
the imposition of the loss of pay of two days pay for each day of a violation and permit
the employee to be placed on probation for a one-year period; (6) permit the public
employer to impose additional penalties in its personnel rules for the violation of the
strike prohibition; (7) permit localities and other public employers to decide whether
they wish to undertake contract negotiations with public employees or their
representatives; (8) require that contracts between public employers and public em-
ployee's organizations expressly shall provide for the retention of management
prerogatives; (9) provide that contracts between public employers and public em-
ployees' organizations are not to be binding until approved by the governing body of
the public employer; (10) permit a public employee to take his grievances directly to
his employer provided that the employer allows this and any resulting adjustment is
not inconsistent with any contract governing the rights between the public employer
and the public employees.
STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 14-15.
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Opposition to these Virginia proposals echoes the traditional objections
to public sector collective bargaining."' The basic argument is that collec-
tive bargaining is meaningless unless supported by the right to strike; that
despite express statutory prohibition states which have adopted collective
bargaining or meet-and-confer legislation have experienced an increase in
strikes;82 that collective bargaining thus invites strikes 3 and that therefore
public sector collective bargaining is incompatible with governmental sov-
ereignty.
The threat to governmental sovereignty assumes two forms. 4 One is that
labor unions, utilizing the strike weapon, will overpower democratically
elected governments and dictate policy.'5 The other danger is that if dis-
putes are submitted to compulsory arbitration as an alternative to the
strike, the final decision regarding the wages and working conditions of
public employees will rest in the hands of a panel of arbitrators. Since the
wages of public employees affect the economic burden placed on taxpayers,
and since the power to tax is vested solely in the legislature, compulsory
arbitration thus constitutes an illegal delegation of legislative power.
The damage potential of public employee unionism is heightened by the
inherent differences in the public and private sectors. The capacity of
private sector unions to inflate costs and prices is limited by profit-seeking,
supply and demand. Such market checks, however, do not prevail in the
public sector. Government agencies are not bound by the duty to make a
profit. Furthermore, government agencies are often the sole providers of
81. Id. at 5-8.
82. In 1960, there were thirty-six strikes by government employees. The first appreciable
increase in strike activity came in 1966, when there were 133 strikes. This was about the time
when many states were enacting collective bargaining legislation. In 1973, there were 387
strikes by public employees. The number of strikes at various levels of government was as
follows: federal-i; state-29; county-40; city-95; school district-210; other local government-
14. HANDBOOK, supra note 2.
83. In the federal sector, where executive orders have established comprehensive bargain-
ing procedures, there were only eight strikes in the eight year period from 1966-1973.
HANDBOOK, supra note 2. One might hypothesize that the increase in strikes among state and
local employees was due to the rapid growth in the number of these employees and the lack
of uniform, sophisticated legislation to deal with their problems.
84. See Sovereignty, supra note 24, at 103-07, 138-39.
85. Several of our -nation's greatest cities can attest to the potential danger of public
employee strikes and the economic burden of unchecked union demands. The San Francisco
Board of Supervisors, however, obeying the mandate of voters, recently cut back employee
pay scales and demonstrated government's ability to stand up to the unions. 122 CONG. REc.
E2,411 (daily ed. May 6, 1976). Some members of Congress recognize that the purpose of
public sector bargaining legislation is to prevent such confrontations by providing a system-
atic approach of reaching agreements and settling disputes. 121 CONG. REc. E5,295 (daily ed.
Oct. 7, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Mineta).
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essential services; the brief interruption of which carries the danger of
extensive harm to the community. "The extortionate possibilities open to
public sector unionization are thus extraordinary in comparison with those
available to private-sector unions."8
In addition to these general considerations, Virginia legislators opposing
collective bargaining feel that public employee problems are solvable
under existing state law. 7 They point out that House Joint Resolutions
Nos. 207, 208 and 2098 further provide for periodic evaluation of wages and
working conditions, require every public employer to include its employees
in the development of policies which affect working conditions and require
that public employees be compensated in proportion to their service to the
public.
Proponents of the Virginia proposals authorizing collective bargaining
argue that the legislation is not a threat to the authority of the Common-
wealth and its local bodies. 9 No governing body is required or compelled
to reach any agreement; the legislation merely provides that if an agree-
ment is reached it is a valid agreement if done pursuant to the terms of
the bill. Final approval of all agreements is reserved to the governing body.
Advocates of the bill further contend that the stringent sanctions enforcing
the strike ban will prove an effective deterrent to such activity.
On a theoretical plane, supporters of collective bargaining feel that state
employees, as citizens, are entitled to the same rights and privileges, ex-
cluding the right to strike, enjoyed by privately employed persons. Due to
the increased number of public employees, individual bargaining is feeble
and impractical. Enlightened management principles notwithstanding,
advocates of collective bargaining are convinced that public employee
rights cannot be fully realized without legislation."
EPILOGUE - THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT SAYS No TO COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
On January 14, 1977, the Virginia Supreme Court"2 reversed the decision
of the trial court in the Arlington County case.93 The court ruled unani-
mously that the Arlington County Board of Supervisors and School Board
86. Sovereignty, supra note 24, at 62.
87. The laws referred to are the public employee grievance procedures and the amendment
to Virginia's right-to-work law giving public employees the right to join unions. See p. 440
supra.
88. H.J. Res. Nos. 207, 208 and 209, Va. Gen. Assembly (1973).
89. STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 16-19.
90. See note 80 supra.
91. STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 19.
92. Commonwealth v. County Bd., Record No. 761421 (Va. Sup. Ct., Jan. 14, 1977).
93. Commonwealth v. Board of Supv'rs of Arlington Cty., at Law No. 18747, 18748 (Arling-
ton Cty. Cir. Ct., Oct. 1, 1976).
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do not have the implied power to engage in collective bargaining with their
employees.9 The policies of the local boards permitting collective bargain-
ing are therefore invalid and the agreements reached through collective
bargaining are void.95
In determining whether the boards' policies permitted and the agree-
ments constituted collective bargaining, the court considered three factors:
(1) the prohibition of strike activity; (2) the preservation of the right of
individual employees to be heard and (3) the recognition of the ultimate
authority of the local boards to make all final decisions." The trial court
said that these three qualifications were adhered to in the boards' policies
and thus the contracts did not constitute collective bargaining agree-
ments."
The supreme court, however, decided that although the policies and
state law prohibit strikes,98 the other two conditions were not met. The
boards' policies purported to preserve the right of an individual employee
to represent himself or to select his own representative in negotiations and
grievance procedures, but this right was effectively curtailed once the or-
ganization was recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative of
all employees.99 In addition, the court determined that the boards had
relinquished some final decision making power to the employee organiza-
tions, particularly in regard to the effect of commitments made in the
agreements and the freedom of the boards to modify the agreements.' 0
These considerations led the court to conclude that, in fact, the con-
tracts were collective bargaining agreements. The court admitted that:
It is doubtless true that the collective bargaining involved here does not
bear all the characteristics attributable to that term in the industrial sector.
But there can be no question that the two boards involved in this case, by
their policies and agreements, not only have seriously restricted the rights of
individual employees to be heard but have also granted to labor unions a
substantial voice in the boards' ultimate decision in important matters af-
fecting both the public employer-employee relationship and the public duties
imposed by law upon the boards.'0 '
The court then turned to the question of whether the local boards had
94. Commonwealth v. County Bd., Record No. 761421 (Va. Sup. Ct., Jan. 14, 1977) at 26.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 14-17.
97. Commonwealth v. Board of Supv'rs of Arlington Cty., at Law No. 18747, 18748 (Arling-
ton Cty. Cir. Ct., Oct. 1, 1976).
98. Commonwealth v. County Bd., Record No. 761421 (Va. Sup. Ct., Jan. 14, 1977) at 14,
18.
99. Id. at 18.
100. Id. at 16-18.
101. Id. at 18.
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the power to collectively bargain with labor organizations.'0 Absent ex-
press statutory authority, it would have been necessary for the court to
infer the existence of this power from general language authorizing the
boards to hire employees and enter into contracts or to declare collective
bargaining a reasonable exercise of the boards' discretionary powers in
carrying out specific duties.' 3
To infer the existence of a particular power from a power expressly
granted, said the court, requires a finding of legislative intent.'10 The court
found itself unable to make that finding, concluding that:
[T]he recent Virginia history of public employee collective bargaining is
persuasive, if not conclusive, that the General Assembly, the source of legis-
lative intent, has never conferred upon local boards, by implication or other-
wise, the power to bargain collectively and that express statutory authority,
so far withheld, is necessary to confer the power.' 5
It is clear from this decision that the court believes that any judicial
approval at this time of public employee collective bargaining would "con-
stitute the creation of a power that does not exist or, at least, the expansion
of an existing power beyond rational limits."'0 6 The issue is thus squarely
before the legislature. The need for a legislative solution is echoed by the
court in its final comment that:
We are faced in this case with overwhelming indications of legislative
intent concerning the concept of collective bargaining in the public sector.
For this court to declare that the boards have the power to bargain collec-
tively, when even the wisdom of incorporating the concept into the general
law of the Commonwealth is the subject of controversial public and political
debate, would constitute judicial legislation, with all the adverse connota-
tions that term generates. Conscious of the respective roles of the General
Assembly and the judiciary, we decline to intrude upon what the Attorney
General succinctly describes as a 'singularly political question.
'
"0
CONCLUSION
The Virginia Supreme Court has now stated that public employers may
not collectively bargain with their employees without express statutory
authority. This decision, however, is not the end of the problem, but hope-
fully the beginning of a legislative solution. The number of public employ-
ees will continue to grow and a workable accommodation is obviously
required.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 26.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 27.
106. Id. at 26.
107. Id. at 29-30.
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Perhaps the greatest bar to rational legislative consideration of the prob-
lems involved is one of semantics. Collective bargaining is an ambiguous
term which perhaps should be eliminated from the vocabulary of public
sector labor relations. Due to inherent differences between the public and
private sectors, collective bargaining for public employees does not, indeed
cannot, carry the same meaning as collective bargaining for private em-
ployees.
What is needed in the public sector is a uniform, comprehensive and
sophisticated framework within which public employers and public em-
ployees can reach agreements and resolve disputes in an orderly fashion.
Such procedures are collective in the sense that the employer meets with
a representative instead of individual employees; they are bargaining in
the sense that the aim is to reach a mutually satisfying accord subject to
such safeguards as no-strike provisions and the preservation of ultimate
authority in the governing body.
Furthermore, legislative responsibility in the area of public sector labor
relations must be viewed in light of the real effect the Virginia Supreme
Court decision will have on localities as they attempt to deal with the
practical necessities of their situations. It is increasingly undesirable, if not
impossible, for public employees to return to individual bargaining. Legis-
lation must provide a viable alternative if tensions are to be avoided. Such
legislation is needed to satisfy the legitimate interests of public employees;
it is more urgently needed to preserve and protect governmental institu-
tions and services.
Frederick R. Kozak
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